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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT DOES NOT HAVE COMPLETE
JURISDICTION OVER CUSTOMARY
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
AND WAR CRIMES
JORDAN J. PAUST*

I.

RECOGNITIONS OF THE LIMITED REACH OF ICC JURISDICTION
OVER INTERNATIONAL CRIMES

It is well-understood that the International Criminal Court
(ICC) does not have jurisdiction over all international crimes.
Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court' declares that the "jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited
to the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole,"2 and proceeds to list merely four crimes
under customary international law (e.g., genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression).3 As
documented in Article 10, it is also understood that nothing in
Part 2 of the Rome Statute (which includes Articles 5 through 21
and contains definitions and/or lists of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes) "shall be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of
international law for purposes other than this Statute."4 It is

* Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.
A.B., UCLA; J.D., UCLA; LL.M., University of Virginia; J.S.D. Cand., Yale
Law School.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(1), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. Id.
3. Id. art. 5(1)(a)-(d).
4. Id. art. 10. It should be noted that what makes conduct a crime under
international law is international law, customary and treaty-based-nothing
more or less. Therefore, there is no other required differentiation between an
international and domestic crime. Consider, for example, the fact that
international crimes include an unreported single act of piracy, pillaging
during war, mercenarism, torture, slavery, or forced disappearance, whereas
the widely publicized acts of a local U.S. serial bank robber who has victimized
eleven U.S. banks in eleven states and hundreds of customers (none of whom
were foreign nationals) is merely a domestic crime. The fact that the reach of
international law does not match some personal theoretic construct is not
relevant no matter how logical or elegant such a preference might otherwise
be and how inconvenient is the reach.
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evident, therefore, that some of the definitions or lists of crimes
contained within Part 2 are not meant to be exclusive or complete
definitions or lists of the crimes under customary international
law. This expectation is also evident in Article 22 of the Rome
Statute, which notes that a person is not criminally responsible
before the ICC "unless the conduct in question constitutes . . . a

crime within the jurisdiction of this Court,"5 that "[t]he definition
of a crime shall be strictly construed,"6 and that "[t]his article shall
not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under
international law independent of this Statute."7 Quite clearly, it is
understood that the Statute's characterizations are not meant to
be exclusive, do not fully reflect other characterizations under
international law, and "shall not affect" or change
characterizations under dynamic customary international law.
Moreover, since a definition within the Rome Statute must also be
"strictly construed," it is evident that the reach of some crimes
under customary international law will be broader.
The recognitions in Articles 5, 10, and 22 are important with
respect to the reach of ICC jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity and war crimes because the definitions or lists within
the Rome Statue concerning such crimes are facially incomplete.
Additionally, with respect to crimes against humanity set forth in
Article 7, the first paragraph in Article 7 uses the limiting phrase
"[flor the purpose of this Statute, 'crime against humanity'
means."8 This phrase necessarily implies recognition of the fact
that other definitional orientations under international law exist
and that they are not fully reflected in Article 7 of the Statute. The
same limiting phrase appears in Article 8, paragraph 2 with
respect to an otherwise lengthy list of war crimes covered under
the Rome Statute,9 thereby providing the same recognition
concerning war crimes reflected in the Statute. When one
considers the combination of recognitions in Articles 5, 7(1), 8(2),
10, and 22, the conclusion is unavoidable that definitions or lists of
crimes against humanity and war crimes set forth in Articles 7
and 8 of the Rome Statute were not expected to provide or mirror
the exclusive measure of such crimes under then extant or future
customary international law. As noted below, Articles 7 and 8 do
not cover all such crimes under customary international law and,
therefore, the ICC has limited jurisdiction over such crimes.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. art. 22(1).
Id. art. 22(2).
Id. art. 22(3).
Id. art. 7(1).
Id. art. 8(2) ("For the purpose of this Statute, 'war crimes' means . . .
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II. THE REACH OF VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY

Two hypotheticals demonstrate the difference between
coverage of crimes against humanity under customary
international legal definitions and that contained in Article 7 of
the Rome Statute. First, assume that instead of using several
aircraft on September 11, 2001, al Qaeda had used one aircraft
and that it hit one of the World Trade Center towers, killing 1,500
persons, and that al Qaeda had never attacked U.S. nationals
before. Second, assume that five private individuals acting on their
own had obtained a rocket with a nuclear warhead and used it to
destroy one half of Tel Aviv, Israel with the intent to retaliate
against Israel's killing of several Palestinians in Gaza. As noted in
this Article, crimes against humanity have been and can be
engaged in by non-state actors,10 but would either hypothetical
attack constitute a crime against humanity under customary

10. See infra notes 22, 33, 36-38, 41 (listing various instances in which nonstate actors have engaged in crimes against humanity and other international
crimes). It should also be noted that under international law there have been
many actors other than "the state," including nations, belligerents, (who, like
the Confederate States of America during the U.S. Civil War, are bound by all
of the customary laws of war) kingdoms, empires, peoples, tribes,
principalities, sultanates, and free cities. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, JON M.
VAN DYKE & LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE
U.S. 10-14 (3d ed. 2009); see also infra notes 22, 33 (addressing the issue of
private actors in this context). Therefore, it is presumptively illogical and
would not be policy-serving to expect that any international crime can be
committed only by the "state" or a "state" actor, and this is not the case. See
infra notes 22, 33, 36-37, 41 (providing examples of non-state actors). More
generally, the principle of inclusivity in international criminal law compels
recognition of the reach of responsibility to any actor that is not expressly
excluded in a particular instrument. See also Opinion and Judgment of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Oct. 1, 1946) ("That
international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as
upon States has long been recognized . .. Crimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities . . .,"), reprinted in 41 Am. J. INT'L

L. 172, 221 (1947); JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
30, 33-35 (3d ed. 2007) (concerning the express reach of modern instruments to
"any person" of any status or affiliation) [hereinafter PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET
AL.]; U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE 178, 1 498 (1956) ("Any person, whether a member of the armed
forces or a civilian, who commits an act which constitutes a crime under
international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment. Such
offenses . . . comprise .

.

. [c]rimes against humanity.") [hereinafter FM 27-10];

text infra notes 15-16 (referencing the language "any person"). Moreover, far
earlier in human history it was recognized that private actors can commit an
extensive variety of international crimes. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The
Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participationin the InternationalLegal
Process, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1229, 1234-35, 1237-39 (2004) (demonstrating
that private people can be actors in crimes against humanity) [hereinafter
Paust, Private Actors].
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definitions and/or that contained in Article 7 of the Rome Statute?
A.

Customary Definitions in the TraditionalInstruments

Customary definitions of crimes against humanity, or crimen
contra omnes, can be found in charters and laws used for
prosecution of crimes against humanity that had been engaged in
during World War II and they are also reflected in a 1950 United
Nations General Assembly resolution documenting the customary
Nuremberg Principles. Article 6, paragraph c of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg defines crimes
against humanity as:
Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated."

11. Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg art. 6(c),
Annex to the London Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Professor
William Schabas, after noting that Article 6 contains no "state plan or policy"
limitation, nonetheless claims that such a limit is "implicit" and appears to
claim that "[t]he chapeau of Article 6 of the Charter" (which merely notes that
"[t]he Tribunal ... shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting
in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as
members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes . . . .")
supports an implied limitation with respect to the reach of crimes against
humanity as such. William A. Schabas, Crimes Against Humanity: The State
Plan or Policy Element, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI 347, 348-49 (Leila

Nadya Sadat & Michael P. Scharf eds., 2008). First, the chapeau merely
expresses a limit of the jurisdiction of the I.M.T, not a supposed limitation of
the reach of customary crimes against humanity. No one could rightly assume
that crimes against humanity can only be committed by "European Axis
countries." Second, private actors are not excluded, since they could be acting
alone "as individuals" but "in the interests" of countries, the phrase "whether
as individuals" certainly does not exclude any individual actors acting "as
individuals," and the phrase "or as members of organizations" certainly does
not exclude private individuals acting "as members" of private organizations.
Moreover, it is clear from the language used that those acting "as" individuals
or members of organizations need not be acting "as" state actors. Third, the
chapeaus of the next three international instruments should be consulted; and
one would recognize that there is a limit to the jurisdiction of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East but it contains no reference to
states or "countries" and covers crimes committed by persons "as individuals
or as members of organizations," and that Control Council Law No. 10
contains no reference to a state or country. See infra notes 12-13 (citing to
various agreements involving the language discussed). Similarly, the 1950
General Assembly Declaration on the Principles of the Nuremberg Charter
and Judgment contains no limiting reference to a state or country and it even
mirrors the principle of inclusivity. See infra text accompanying notes 15-16
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The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East (Tokyo Charter) has a similar definition:
Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 12

Control Council Law No. 10, which was used for prosecutions
in Europe in certain national military commissions, contains the
following definition:
Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offenses, including but not
limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of
the country where perpetrated.' 3
In 1950, generally shared opinio juris of the international
community was expressed by the United Nations General
Assembly when it reaffirmed common features of the three World
War II definitions noted above and set forth its Declaration on the
Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment that had been
formulated by the International Law Commission of the U.N.14
The first principle in the Declaration on Principles mirrors the
general principle of inclusivity when affirming that "[a]ny person
who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international
law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment."1 5
Thereafter, the General Assembly identified which acts constitute
crimes against humanity:
Crimes against humanity:
Murder,

extermination,

enslavement,

deportation

and

other

(demonstrating how this principle is implicit in the language).
12. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5(c),
as amended by General Orders No. 20, Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
13. Allied Control Council Law No. 10, art. II(1)(c), Dec. 20, 1945, Control
Council for Germany, Official Gazette 50 (Jan. 31, 1946).
14. International Law Commission, Declaration on the Principles of the
Nuremberg Charterand Judgment, at 11-14 99, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950). In

1946, the General Assembly had also affirmed the principles of international
law recognized in the Nuremberg Charter and the judgment of the I.M.T. See
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter
of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946) ("[ajffirms the principles of international law
recognized by the Charter . . . and the judgment of the Tribunal .... .")
(unanimous vote).
15. Id. princ. I. With respect to the principle of inclusivity, see supra note 10
(covering the inclusivity of non-state actors).
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inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or
such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection
with any crime against peace or any war crime. 16
Each of the customary definitions noted above addresses
"crimes against humanity" in the plural and identifies two basic
types of crimes against humanity: (1) inhumane acts committed or
done against any civilian population, and (2) persecutions of
persons on certain stated grounds.17 Importantly, a single crime
against humanity can involve an inhumane act or a persecution on
stated grounds, whereas "crimes" involve acts or persecutions.
With respect to the two hypotheticals noted above, the first type of
crime against humanity would be relevant, especially the act of
murder. Moreover, it is recognized that although the phrase
"civilian population" might theoretically require an impermissible
act against an entire population, actual trends in decision and
patterns of generally shared expectation support the reach of this
phrase to acts committed or done against civilians as opposed to a
population as such.18 There is no requirement that the perpetrator
of a crime against humanity have any particular status, such as
that of a state actor, belligerent, or member of an organization of
any sort. There is no requirement that an inhumane act be

16. Id. princ. VI(c).
17. PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 704-06, 721, 744.
18. See, e.g., id., at 744 (quoting the U.N. War Crimes Commission Report
of 1948, '[acts] against civilians'); see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 113 & n. 220 (July, 29, 2004) (during
an armed conflict, "civilians" include those "taking no active part in the
hostilities"); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T,
Trial Chamber Judgment, 1 127 (May 21, 1999) (includes "all persons except
those who have the duty to maintain public order and have the legitimate
means to exercise force."). Moreover, even under more restrictive definitional
orientations convictions of persons for crimes against humanity have occurred
when as few as 1, 3, 7, 11, 30, or 44 direct victims had been targeted. See, e.g.,
PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 745. See also LYAL S. SUNGA,
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 136 (1992) (stating that an attack on one person can

suffice); Irwin Cotler, InternationalDecisions:Regina v. Finta [1994], 90 AM.
J. INT'L L. 460, 470, n.62 (1996) (stating that "against even one victim" is
enough); cf United States v. Altstoetter, (The Justice Case), 3 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL

COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 284 ([1948] 1951) (claiming that "isolated cases of
Previously, some
atrocities or persecutions" should not be included).
textwriters had seemingly missed the trends in judicial decision regarding
convictions when there were only a few direct victims and had preferred that
there be a large number of direct victims. See Catherine R. Blanchet, Some
Troubling Elements in the Treaty Language of the Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminalCourt, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 647, 657-58 (2003) (seeming
to define the terms "widespread" and "systematic" as excluding isolated
incidents).
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widespread or systematic or be part of some widespread or
systematic conduct, cause great or serious injury, or be in
furtherance of some state or organizational policy. In view of the
above, it is clear that under the customary definitions both
hypothetical attacks were on civilians and can constitute crimes
against humanity under customary international law.

B. Newer Definitions with a More Limited Reach
In the 1990s, one finds new definitional orientations that
have a more limited reach. For example, in 1993 the Secretary
General of the United Nations issued a report with respect to the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that
preferred additional limiting elements not found in any of the
traditional international legal instruments. The report contained
the following definitional preferences:
Crimes against humanity
47. Crimes against humanity were first recognized in the Charter
and Judgement of the Nurnberg Tribunal, as well as in Law No. 10
of the Control Council for Germany.' 9 Crimes against humanity are
aimed at any civilian population and are prohibited regardless of
whether they are committed in an armed conflict, international or
internal in character.
48. Crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very
serious nature, such as wilful killing, torture or rape, committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.
In the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, such
inhumane acts have taken the form of so-called "ethnic cleansing"
and widespread and systematic rape and other forms of sexual
19. This statement regarding first recognitions is in manifest error. For
pre-World War II recognitions of crimes against humanity and offences
against the laws of humanity, see, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note

10, at 702-04, 748; (discussing relevant cases) Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR96-4-T Trial Chamber Judgment,
565-66 (Sept. 2, 1998); infra note 33. In
1849, the Supreme Court of Texas declared that by then "a more elevated
sense of right, of justice, and the laws of humanity has asserted an ascendency
over the cruelty and despotism of the past[,]" that "[i]t instructs and
commands, in a language that will be obeyed, the commanding general that he
shall use no unnecessary rigor even to the prisoners taken in battle; that to
the peaceful citizen, not found in the ranks of war, he is to extend the arm of
protection to his person and property[,]" and that "[o]n this subject, public
opinion in almost every civilized community, has proved one of the most
humane and beneficial portions of the law of nations." McMullen v. Hodge
and Others, 5 Tex. 34, 23 (1849). This substantially predates similar
recognitions in the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg ("contrary to the laws of
humanity"), extract available in PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at

679, and the 'Martens clause" in the preamble to the Hague Convention IV
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. No. 539[hereinafter HC IV].
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assault, including enforced prostitution . . . .20
Under paragraph 48 of the report, the conduct addressed in
the two hypotheticals noted above could involve responsibility for
crimes against humanity. With respect to the hypothetical
involving an attack on one of the World Trade Center towers with
one aircraft, one might logically conclude that the attack was
"widespread," since a large number of persons were killed even
though they were killed merely in one building and aircraft. Per
hypo, however, the attack was not "systematic." The same
conclusions would apply to the targeting of Tel Aviv in the second
hypothetical. It should also be noted that the Secretary-General's
report did not adopt the approach regarding inhumane acts found
in the customary definitions and used a new limitation set forth in
the phrase "of a very serious nature."
It is interesting that the actual Statute of the ICTY did not
adopt the Secretary-General's definition. Instead, it uses the
phrase "the following crimes . . . directed against any civilian

population[,]" and then lists several types of acts that would
constitute such crimes, including "murder" and "inhumane acts."21
It does not contain any limitation that would require either a
widespread or systematic act. Moreover, as in the case of
customary crimes against humanity, no plan or policy is
required, 22 and most of the acts against civilians that are
20. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), TT 47-48, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993),
reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 1163, 1173 (1993).
21. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
art. 5, Res. 827, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter
Statute of the ICTY].
22. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment,
223 (Apr. 19, 2004) (stating that customary crimes against
humanity do not require a plan or policy); see also PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 707, 711 (Krstic, ICTY), 727 (Sadat: French court's
requirement of a "German plan" was a "revisionist approach" that had
resulted in outrage), 729 (Sadat: the "most egregious error was the
introduction of the French requirements of 'hegemonic state' and 'execution of
a common plan'), 731 (Sadat: common plan is not a requirement and was part
of an entirely separate offense at Nuremberg), 753 (Rutaganda, ICTR), 769
(Cassese); John Cerone, The JurisprudentialContributionsof the ICTR to the
Legal Definition of Crimes Against Humanity-The Evolution of the Nexus
Requirement, 14 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 191, 197-99, n.18 (2008), citing
Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-20-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
269 (May 20, 2005) (stating that a plan is not necessary); Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 11 89, 98 (June 12, 2002)
(stating that attacks need not be supported by a policy or a plan), among other
cases; John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 19
(2008) (declaring that "private actors have duties ... not to commit ... crimes
against humanity, or genocide."); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Complex
Architecture of InternationalJustice, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 38, 38 (2006-2007)
(reiterating that private actors can be liable for aiding and abetting "genocide
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or crimes against humanity . . . ."); Jennifer M. Smith, An InternationalHit
Job: Prosecuting Organized Crime Acts as Crimes Against Humanity, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1111, 1126-28 & nn.148-149 (2009) (finding that national courts and the
ICTY have "recognized that private actors could commit crimes against
humanity[,]" and state policy is not required; and since the Appeals Chamber
decision in Prosecutor v. Kunarac "explicitly held that a policy or plan is not
even an element of crimes against humanity under customary international
law . .. other ICTY and ICTR judgments have consistently reaffirmed that a
plan or policy is not a requisite legal element . . . [listing 12 ICTY cases and 4
ICTR cases]. For example, the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Semanza v.
Prosecutor reaffirmed that the existence of a plan or policy is not" required
"and rejected the defendant's contention that crimes against humanity require
'the existence of a political objective' and 'the implication of high level political
and/or military authorities in the definition and establishment of [a]
methodical plan'.. . ."); Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: "The Door is
Still Ajar"for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533,
538 (2004-2005) (noting the holding that private corporations can be
responsible for "violations that do not require state action, such as crimes
against humanity . . . ."); Leila Sadat Wexler, Prosecutionsfor Crimes Against
Humanity in French Municipal Law: International Implications, 91 PROC.,
AM.

SOC. INT'L L. 270,

273 & n.13

(1997)

(French

case

addition of

requirements of "systematic," "state policy," and "a 'common plan' (a
misreading of the conspiracy charge" at Nuremberg), were "so distant from its
international meaning" and "distorted," and the courts "misinterpret[ed]
international norms"); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating "We hold . . . that Karadzic may be found liable for genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private capacity. . . ."); Prosecutor
v. Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao, Case No, SCSL-04-15-t (Special Court for Sierra
Leone) Judgment, T$ 78-79 (Mar. 2, 2009) (stating that "existence of a policy
or plan, or that the crimes were supported by a policy or plan to carry them
out,

. .

. is not a separate legal requirement . . . ."); FM 27-10. supra note 10

(affirming that no plan is necessary); supra notes 11-16 and accompanying
text (showing none of the customary instruments require a plan or policy);
infra note 33 (giving examples of crimes against humanity which do not
involve a plan). But see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 244, 247 (1992); VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL
P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 79-80 (1995); Schabas, supra note 11, at 347-48,

358, 360, 362-63 (claiming that Professor Bassiouni's admittedly rare minority
viewpoint that crimes against humanity can only be committed by state actors
pursuant to a state plan or policy is somehow customary); William A. Schabas,
State Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 953, 972-74 (2008) (claiming that requiring a State plan or
policy as an element of a crime against humanity would have many
advantages in terms of coherence and judicial policy.)
Moreover, human rights are violated when crimes against humanity are
committed and it is informing that human rights violations can occur at the
hands of private perpetrators, with or without any plan or policy and
regardless of the fact that violations are not widespread or systematic. See,
e.g., Paust, Private Actors, supra note 10, at 1241-45 (recognizing that many
human rights instruments prohibit groups or individuals from engaging in
such conduct); Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under
Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51 (1992); see also infra notes 33,
41 (displaying the many crimes against humanity and other international
crimes committed by private actors). From a human rights perspective, every
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identified do not have to be engaged in "on national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious grounds." 23 Despite the definition set
forth in the Statute of the ICTY, some opinions within the ICTY
proffered startling new limitations that were clearly the result of
judicial activism or attempts at judicial legislation. For example,
an early opinion declared that acts against civilians must be
organized and systematic despite the fact that these two limiting
words do not appear in the Statute of the ICTY or in any of the
traditional international legal instruments. 24 Acceptance of this
type of limitation would obviously obviate jurisdiction over the
types of customary crimes against humanity addressed in the two
hypotheticals and would not be preferable.
One year after creation of the ICTY, the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)25 adopted a
new requirement that crimes against humanity within the
new attempt to limit criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity is
threatening to human dignity, the ultimate raison d'etre for the existence of
crimen contra omnes, which are crimes committed against us and that bear
our name. Concerning the human rights base of crimes against humanity, see,
e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 711, and references cited; see
also Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into
Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2638 (1991) ("crimes
against human rights"); Robert Lansing, Notes on World Sovereignty, 15 AM. J.
INT'L L. 13, 25 (1921) (the prohibition of the slave trade as "a crime against
humanity" was "[u]nder the influence" of "the rights of man"). Additionally, it
has long been recognized that numerous types of international crimes can be
committed by private actors. See, e.g., Paust, Private Actors, supra note 10, at
1234, 1237-41 (listing instances of crimes against humanity and other
international crimes being committed by private actors). In fact, I know of no
general international crime that can only be committed by a state actor. For
example, consider early references to offenses against peace by private actors,
including breaches of neutrality (including breaches of treaties of neutralitythe very crimes recognized in the 1919 Report of the Responsibilities
Commission and the I.M.T. at Nuremberg), territorial infractions, acts of
hostility, and aggression. Id. at 1238 & n.30; PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra
note 10, at 173, 222-30, 561-77. These can also be committed by nations,
belligerents, and insurgents and surely not merely by states. See also the Trial
of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, addressed in PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra
note 10, at 301-02 (Arbuthnot was guilty of exciting Indians to war against the
U.S. in violation of the law of nations and Ambrister was guilty of levying war
against the U.S. by taking command of hostile Indians to give battle against
the law of nations).
23. Under customary international law, only the persecution-type crime
against humanity needs to be engaged in on certain discriminatory grounds.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
IT 283-85, 288-95 (July 15, 1999) (also expressly addressing the inconsistent
Report of the Secretary-General) Id.
293-97; infra note 27.
24. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Trial Chamber, 1
26 (Oct. 20, 1995) (stating that acts must be organized and systematic and
that the crimes considered as a whole must be of a certain gravity).
25. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. Doc. S/955, Annex (Nov. 8, 1994).
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jurisdiction of the ICTR be "committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds[,]" 26 thereby adding a
"widespread or systematic" limitation, fusing the two general
types of crimes against humanity into one committed as part of an
"attack" against "civilians" (and thereby excluding persecutiontype acts against military personnel), and limiting the reach of the
jurisdiction of the ICTR to acts engaged in merely on certain
"grounds." 27 It is evident, therefore, that ICTR jurisdiction cannot
reach all forms of customary crimes against humanity.
C. Limits in the Rome Statute

A far more severely limiting definition of crimes against
humanity is contained in the Rome Statute, thus limiting its
jurisdiction over customary crimes against humanity and leaving
prosecution of customary crimes that are not covered to domestic
courts of various states and to other international criminal
tribunals with a broader jurisdictional competence. The first
limitation, one that does not appear in any of the customary
international legal instruments, is the requirement in Article 7(1)
that a relevant act be "committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack."28 Presumably this new requirement would not
obviate ICC jurisdiction over crimes against humanity addressed
in the two hypotheticals if one concludes that the attack in each
hypothetical was "widespread." If not, there would be no ICC
jurisdiction. Curiously, however, Article 7 contains a limiting
definition of "attack" that is lacking in common sense. Instead of
recognizing that one attack can constitute an "attack," Article
7(2)(a) requires that an "attack" involve "a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts" referred to in a prior
paragraph. 29 This additional limitation would obviate ICC
jurisdiction with respect to each hypothetical because, although

26. Id. art. 3.
27. Id. See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdiction, Definition of
Crimes, and Triggering Mechanisms, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 233, 253
(1997) ("There is no reason that such a limitation should apply . . . ."); Cotler,
supra note 18, at 468 ("a requirement of 'discrimination' [on certain grounds]
is not one mandated under international law."); supra note 23. Some judges in
cases before the ICTR were also activist, even following merely French activist
opinions. PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 753 (for example,
Rutaganda citing merely Akayesu, which cited merely Eichmann (and missing
the circumstance of a crime against humanity targeting 93 direct victims),
Barbie, Touvier, and Papon). Concerning French activist errors, see id. at 727,
729, 731 (addressing points made by Professor Sadat noted supra note 22); see
generally Sadat Wexler, supra note 22 (addressing misinterpretations by the
French court).
28. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
29. Id. art. 7(2)(a).
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each involved an actual attack, neither involved the multiple
commission of relevant acts.
Also problematic is Article Ts use of the word "attack" instead
of phrases found in the traditional international legal instruments
such as "acts committed against,"30 "acts committed,"31 and "acts
done against."32 The word "attack" can be far more limiting than
the customary phrases, since a logical interpretation of an "attack"
on civilians might not cover their ill-treatment once they are
detained (for example, during interrogation), rape, sexual assault,
secret detention or forced disappearance, secret deportation,
persecution, use as slave laborers, placement in horrendous
concentration camps, or being paraded into gas chambers-all acts
that have been associated with crimes against humanity33 and
30. See text supra notes 11, 13 (discussing instruments including this
language).
31. See text supranote 12 (citing a provision including this language).
32. See text supranote 16 (citing a provision including this language).
33. For early U.S. federal and state court cases identifying conduct of
private actors involving rape, incest, slavery, and the slave trade as crimes
against humanity, offenses against the laws of humanity, and/or crimes
against mankind, see, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 702-03
(discussing briefly such cases); United States v. Darnaud, 25 F. Cas. 754, 760
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 14,918) (slave trade related to a "crime against
mankind"); State v. Robbins, 221 Ind. 125, 46 N.E.2d 691 (1943) (sodomy of a
girl is a "crime against mankind"); see also United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas.
227, 231 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No. 15,329) (Campbell, J., on circuit) (Justice
Campbell affirmed President Jefferson's recognition in a Second Annual
Message to Congress on December 2, 1806 that participation by U.S. citizens
in the slave trade was a crime against "human rights"); Henfield's Case, 11 F.
Cas. 1099, 1107 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Justice Wilson on circuit
addressing private actor breaches of neutrality and the commission of
hostilities that involve criminal violations of "duties of humanity"); 1 Op. Att'y
Gen. 515 (1821) ("crimes against the human family" committed by "enemies of
the whole human family," including 'poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by
profession . . . ." quoting Vattel (1758)); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 513 (1821)

("crimes against mankind"); EMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 464-65 (J.
Chitty ed. 1883) (violence against a foreign ambassador is a "crime against
mankind . . . ."); Lansing, supra note 22. For U.S. prosecutions of German
industrialists for their involvement in slave labor, see, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI,
ET AL., supra note 10, at 312-13 (citing cases); see also Doug Cassel, Corporate
Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6
Nw. U.J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 304, 304 (2008) (regarding crimes against human
rights committed by corporate elites); Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights
Responsibilities of Private Corporations,35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 803
n.4, 805, 806 n.9 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548112
(discussing crimes including slave or forced labor, torture, and crimes against
women); infra note 41 (explaining that genocide is a crime against humanity
committed by private actors). For U.S. cases finding that secret detention or
forced disappearance is actionable for civil sanction purposes, see, e.g., In re
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475
(9th Cir. 1994) (concerning torture); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506
SI, 2007 WL 2349336, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Aug 14, 2007) (stating "there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence of . .. forced disappearance [in Nigeria] to
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that otherwise appear in subparagraphs (a) through (k) in Article
7(1) of the Rome Statute. Perhaps there is a special definition of
"attack" within Article 7(2)(a) that avoids such a limitation,
however, because part of the definition of "attack" contained
therein focuses on the phrase "a course of conduct involving the
multiple commission of acts." 34 The word "conduct" can cover
relevant acts, but the limitations contained in the phrases "course
of conduct" and "multiple commission of acts" are still problematic.
For example, they would not cover a single act of torture, rape,
sexual assault, persecution, or inhumane treatment or a single
forced disappearance unless one concludes that secret detention
over a period of time involves a "course of conduct" and multiple
acts. It is possible, however, that these acts will suffice if they are
committed "as part of" a widespread or systematic attack,
although they would not constitute an "attack" under Article
7(2)(a).
What is even more limiting of ICC jurisdiction over customary
crimes against humanity is the additional requirement in
paragraph 2(a) that such multiple acts be engaged in "pursuant to
or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack."3 5 This additional limitation would clearly obviate ICC
jurisdiction over the five private persons who used a nuclear
weapon to destroy half of Tel Aviv. It would also obviate
jurisdiction over state actors if they were rogue state officials or
employees of a state that had engaged in the same conduct outside
of any state or organizational policy, although far fewer deaths
engaged in over time pursuant to a policy of a private organization

support tort claims .... ); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 416, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (addressing human rights and listing "causing the
disappearance of individuals" as actionable); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162, 184-85 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that caused disappearance constituted
recognized violations of international law); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.
Supp. 707, 710-12 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (supporting the characterization of
"disappearance" as violating universally recognized human rights); 22 U.S.C. §
2151n(a) (2006) (including "prolonged detention without charges, causing the
disappearance of persons . .. and clandestine detention of those persons .... ");
Id. § 2304(d)(1) ("causing the disappearance of persons" is among "flagrant"
and "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights"); S. REP. No.
102-249, at 9 (1991), quoted in Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 172.
34. Rome Statute, supranote 1, art. 7(2)(a). See also Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Case No. IT-96-23/1-A 1 86 (the word attack "encompasses any mistreatment
of the civilian population").
35. Id. Existence of a plan or policy is certainly not a requirement under
customary international law or before the ICTY, ICTR, and Special Court for
Sierra Leone. See supra note 22 (citing authors who explain that a plan or a
policy is not needed). Moreover, private actors have committed crimes against
humanity without being part of an organization. See supra notes 22, 33 (listing
cases and articles involving private actors committing crimes against
humanity and other international crimes).
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engaged in organized crime would be covered.3 6 Al Qaeda is
doubtless an organization with an "organizational policy," but the
multiple acts limitation contained within the Statute's definition
of "attack" still leaves the ICC without jurisdiction over the
hypothetical's single widespread attack on civilians as a covered
crime against humanity despite extensive recognition that the
actual 9/11 attacks were crimes against humanity under
customary international law.37 Nonetheless, conduct addressed in
36. See, e.g., Sonia Merzon, ExtraterritorialReach of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 887, 901 (2007), citing Tom
Obokata, Trafficking of Human Beings as a Crime Against Humanity: Some
Implications for the InternationalLegal System, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 445,
445 (2005) (concerning the seriousness of the crime of human trafficking in the
international law community); Smith, supra note 22, at 1122-1124, 1129-30,
1139-52 (showing that the term "organization" also covers private, non-state
actors); Bruce Zagaris, U.S. International CooperationAgainst Transnational
Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1401, 1462 (1998) (regarding "genocide
and crimes against humanity by transnational organized crime groups. . . .").
37. Quite clearly, however, al Qaeda is a non-state actor organization that
has used both widespread and systematic attacks against civilians as part of a
continued plan to engage in social violence and even persecutions on political,
religious, and national origin grounds and various members can be prosecuted
for crimes against humanity. See, e.g., HELEN DUFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR"
AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76-93 (2005) (addressing the
responsibility of non-state actors under international law); JAVAID REHMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 464-65 (2003)
(considering how terrorism fits into international criminal law); Roberta
Arnold, Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity under the ICC Statute, in
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM 121, 131 (Giuseppe
Nesi ed. 2006) (also addressing other non-state actor terroristic targetings as
crimes against humanity); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Globalization and
Jurisprudence:An Islamic Perspective, 54 EMORY L.J. 25, 30 (2005) (describing
9/11 as a crime against humanity that the ICC would have had jurisdiction
over had it existed at the time); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of
InternationalTerrorism:A Policy-OrientedAssessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83,
101 (2002) (stating "the attacks upon the United States of September 11
constitute 'Crimes Against Humanity' as defined in Article 7 of the Statute of
the . . . (ICC)."); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also DisruptingSome Crucial
Legal Categoriesof International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 994-95 (2001)
(supporting the view that terrorism is considered prohibited by international
law); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime,
Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the InternationalLegal Order, 81 N.C.
L. REV. 1, 60-62 (2002) (assuming that al Qaeda does have an organizational
policy, and their acts are crimes against humanity); James D. Fry, Terrorism
as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide: The Backdoor to Universal
Jurisdiction,7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169, 190 (2002) (finding that
the terrorist attacks on September 11 meet all the requirements of a crime
against humanity); John W. Head, Essay: The United States and International
Law After September 11, 11 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (2001) (discussing
terrorist acts in the context of international customary law); Irene Zubaida
Khan, The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear: Human Rights in the TwentyFirst Century, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (Amnesty International
also recognized 9/11 as a crime against humanity); Chibli Mallat, The Original
Sin: 'Terrorism" or "Crime Against Humanity'?, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
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245, 246-47 (2002) (qualifying the September 11 attack as a crime against
humanity); Stephen P. Marks, Branding the 'War on Terrorism": Is There a
"New Paradigm"ofInternationalLaw?, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 71, 86 & n.52
(2006) (U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights also recognized 9/11 as a
crime against humanity); Juan E. Mendez, Human Rights Policy in the Age of
Terrorism, 46 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 377, 377 n.1 (2002) (explaining that "terrorism"
clearly fits into the definition of crimes against humanity); Thomas Michael
McDonnell, The Death Penalty-An Obstacle to the "War on Terrorism"?, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 353, 384 n.150, 393 (2004) (reasoning that terrorist
acts would not be justified under international law); Jordan J. Paust,
Responding Lawfully to al Qaeda, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 759, 761 (2007) (stating
that such attacks constitute human rights violations and crimes against
humanity); Vincent-Joel Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the
InternationalCriminal Court in the Post-September 11th Era: Should Acts of
Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity?, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1009, 1023 (2004) (analyzing the legal concepts of terrorism and crimes
against humanity); Ron Sievert, A New Perspective on the International
Criminal Court: Why the Right Should Embrace the ICC and How America
Can Use It, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 77, 100 & n.116 (2006) (also noting that ICC
Prosecutor Louis Ocampo stated before a meeting of the ABA that "he would
be willing to prosecute al Qaeda for the World Trade Center attacks based
solely on the crimes against humanity charges currently available in the ICC
criminal code"); Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 135, 148-49 (2004) (arguing the 9/11 attacks fit the
definition of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute); David J.
Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 49, 50 n.6 (2002) (acknowledging the 9/11 attacks as
crimes against humanity); J.M. Spectar, Beyond the Rubicon: Presidential
Leadership, InternationalLaw & the Use of Force in the Long Hard Slog, 22
CONN. J. INT'L L. 47, 63 (2006) (stating the al Qaeda attack was a crime
against humanity); Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal
Definition of Terrorism, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 357, 386 n.115 (2003)
(citing Professor Michael P. Scharf on the discussion of including terrorist acts
as a crime against humanity); Sabine von Schorlemer, Human Rights:
Substantive and Institutional Implications of the War Against Terrorism, 14
EUR. J. INT'L L. 265, 272-74 (2003) (characterizing the 9/11 attacks as crimes
against humanity); Corey Winer, Smoke 'Em Out: U.S. Counterterrorist
Mishaps Necessitating the Expansion of INTERPOL's Capabilitiesto Meet the
New Terrorist Threat, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 145, 160 & n.76 (2010)
(INTERPOL condemned 9/11 as a crime against humanity); Warren Richey,
Tribunals on Trial, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 14, 2001, at 1
(quoting Professor Leila Sadat: "actions of Sept. 11 aren't war crimes, they are
civilian crimes, they are crimes against humanity[.]"); Frederic L. Kirgis,
Clarificationof Insight on TerroristAttacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, ASIL INSIGHTS, Kirgis addendum Sept. 20, 2001, available
athttp://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm(discussing the 9/11 attack);
id., Paust, Addendum 2 (regarding prosecution of Mr. bin Laden); see also
Schabas, supra note 11, at 362 (noting views of U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights Mary Robinson, Geoffrey Robertson, Alain Pellet, and others);
but see Schabas, supra note 11, at 347, 362 (preferring what is an admittedly
rare minority view claimed more recently by Professor Bassiouni that al
Qaeda and any other non-state actor cannot be guilty of a crime against
humanity. But see Bassiouni, supra note 11 (concerning his recognition in
2002).
Canadian courts have also recognized private actor complicity or leader
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the hypothetical could be prosecuted by the ICC as genocide
involving murderous targetings of U.S. nationals with the intent
to destroy part of such a national group. 38 Additionally, non-state
terrorists who do not operate under an "organizational" policy
while committing customary crimes against humanity would not
be covered by the Statute, nor would private perpetrators of slave
trading if they were not acting in accordance with a state or
organizational policy. In my opinion, none of these limitations on
the meaning of "attack" are preferable, but they appear in the
Statute and will condition ICC jurisdiction until the Statute is
amended.
What is also most curious is that the Rome Statute uses the
customary definition of genocide,3 9 which is known to be a special
type of crime against humanity,40 and it contains no widespread or
responsibility for crimes against humanity committed by the Sri Lanka
insurgent group LLTE. See, e.g., Sivakumar v. R, Case No. IMM-1600-95,1997
WL 1913825, at
6 (Fed. Ct. Can. Jan. 24,1997) (leader responsibility);
Pushpanathan v. Canada, Case No. T93-08842, 2002 WL 31918433, at 17
(Imm. & Refugee Bd. App. Div. June 4, 2002) (private actor complicity).
38. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 6 (defining genocide as killing
members of a group in whole or part); Fry, supra note 37, at 169-70, 193-94;
Frederic Megret, Justice in Times of Violence, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 327, 344-45
& n.34 (2003) (addressing al Qaeda 9/11 attacks as genocide). However,
jurisdiction of the ICC is limited with respect to the date when a crime is
committed. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 11 (stating that jurisdiction
may only be exercised, with exception to Article 12 and 13, for crimes after a
State has entered the Statute).
39. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 6; PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra
note 10, at 800-01; Jordan J. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're Not Going
to Get Away With It, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 90, 90-91, 93-94 (1989).
40. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 442-43 (2d ed. 2005);

PAUST, BASSIOuNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 709-10, 714-15, 717, 722, 726, 730;
ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 179

(3d ed. 2003); Jordan J. Paust, Threats to Accountability After Nuremberg:
Crimes Against Humanity, Leader Responsibility and National Fora, 12
N.Y.L.S. J. HUM. RTS. 547 (1995); William A. Schabas, Punishment of NonState Actors in Non-InternationalArmed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 907,
919-20 (2003) (non-state actors can commit "types of crimes against
humanity-genocide, apartheid, torture"); Michael Scharf, The Letter of the
Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human
Rights Crimes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 54 (1996); Leila Sadat Wexler,
The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of
Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANS. L.
289, 360 (1994); The Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, 1 68 (Dec. 14, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, ICTR95-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1 89 (May 2, 1999); Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 1 140 (Oct. 2, 1995); see also
Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan Stigall, Wings for Talons: The Case for
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Over Sexual Exploitation of Children Through
Cyberspace, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 109, 135 n.100 (2004) (genocide is a crimen
contra omnes); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-96-16-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, T 636 (Jan. 14, 2000) (persecution-type of crime against humanity

2010]

Customary Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes

697

systematic requirement, no potentially limiting requirement of an
"attack," no multiple acts requirement for every form of genocide,
and no state or organizational policy type of limitation. Moreover,
everyone knows that genocide is a crime under customary
international law that can be committed by private actors.41 The
fact that genocide is a special type of customary crime against
humanity and that the definition of genocide does not contain
various limitations set forth with respect to other crimes against
humanity in Article 7 of the Rome Statute adds to the recognition
that definitions of customary crimes against humanity need not
have such limitations and that Article 7 does not cover all crimes
against humanity under customary international law.
Within Article 7, one finds another potential limitation that is
not found in the customary international legal instruments. Under
Article 7(1)(k), inhumane acts must either cause "great suffering,

belongs to the same genus as genocide); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 650 F.
Supp.2d 1004, 1021-23 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (regarding actionable claims against
an international mining group for "crimes against humanity amounting to
genocide and torture").
41. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, art. IV ("or private individual"), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948); CASSESE,
supra note 40, at 444; MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNGCHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 355 (1980); SEAN D.
MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 423 (2006); PAUST, BASSIOUNI,
ET AL., supra note 10, at 784; ELLEN S. PODGOR & ROGER S. CLARK,
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 169 (2 ed. 2008); Knox, supra
note 22, at 19, 27-28; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 22; Schabas, supra note 40, at
919-20; Zagaris, supra note 36; The Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A
66-68 (July 5, 2001) (evidence of "a one-man
Appeals Chamber Judgment,
genocide mission, intent on personally wiping out the protected group in whole
or in part" existed to support a conviction); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 732 n.20 (2004); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, Ltd., 504 F3d 254, 270
n.5, 273, 283 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring); Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
395 F.3d 932, 954 (9th Cir. 2002); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-42 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 650 F.
Supp.2d at 1021-23; Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp.2d 257, 271, 27478, 289, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (also recognizing private actor conduct as crimes
against humanity and genocide and private actor complicity with respect to
each international crime); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 244 F. Supp.2d 289, 305-06, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Bodner v. Banque
Paribas, 114 F. Supp.2d 117, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); U.N. G.A. Res. 96(1), 1 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188-89 (1946) (whether the actors are
"private individuals, public officials or statesmen"). There is absolutely no
requirement that genocide be committed by state actors or by private actors
who engage in conduct as part of a state plan or policy or with the consent or
acquiescence of a state or public official. See also CASSESE, supra note 40, at
444 (there is no requirement of a widespread or systematic practice, a plan or
policy, or involvement of governmental authorities). For additional U.S. cases
finding genocide to be actionable for civil sanction purposes, see, e.g., Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 762-63 (Breyer, J., concurring); Mehinovic v.
Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp.2d 1322, 1354-55 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
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or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health."42 it
would be completely out of line with trends in judicial decision and
general patterns of expectation concerning the meaning of
inhumane or inhuman treatment of human beings to require
"great suffering," 43 but what saves this provision from being far too
restrictive is the fact that inhumane treatment is necessarily
"serious."44

Additional limitations are contained in paragraph 2(e) and (i)
that do not reflect customary international law. Article 7(2)(e)
provides a restrictive limitation with respect to torture. The
limitation relates to victims and only covers "a person in the
custody or under the control of the accused . . . ."45 Clearly,
however, complicity in "torture" under customary international
law can occur with respect to a person aiding and abetting another
person who has control of a direct victim and the complicitor who
lacks custody or control will be an "accused." 46 Dereliction of duty
of a leader with respect to "torture" can occur even though the
leader who is an "accused" does not have custody or control of the
direct victim. 47 An "accused" can also be a member of a joint
criminal enterprise and be an accused without having custody or
control of the direct victim. 48 Additionally, the direct perpetrator of
torture could be a person who does not have custody or control of
the victim, e.g., one who directs a robotic torture machine to
torture a victim in the custody or control of someone else. The ICC
limitation will simply leave jurisdictional competence and
42. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(k).
43. Concerning inhumane or inhuman treatment and the fact that "great"
suffering is not required, see, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibitionof
Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1535,
1558, n.73 (2009) quoting Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp.2d 1322, 134749 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (noting that some degrading and inhumane sexual acts
may not be severe suffering, but are nonetheless unlawful) [hereinafter Paust,
Torture], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331159;Jordan J. Paust,
Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee
Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked
Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345, 408-10 (2007) (noting tests or
criteria regarding humiliating and degrading treatment) [hereinafter Paust,
Above the Law], available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1485024.
44. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ETAL., supra note 10, at 666, 675, 676 n.20,
775, 820 n.5; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (the crimes listed within the
jurisdiction of the ICC are all "most serious." Thus, for example, inhuman acts
covered in Article 8(2)(a)(ii) are necessarily "serious").
45. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(e).
46. See PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 44-49; Paust, Torture,
supra note 43, at 1544-45, 1559-67, 1569 (addressing aiding or abetting). As
the materials cited clearly demonstrate, complicity does not require
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art.
substantial assistance or facilitation.
25(3)(c)-(d).
47. See PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ETAL., supra note 10, at 52-78.
48. Id. at 32-33, 37-38.

2010]

Customary Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes

699

responsibility to initiate prosecution of persons with some forms of
responsibility with respect to torture to states or some other
international criminal tribunal.
Neither the Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons,49 nor the International Convention for
5
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance o
contain the severely limiting phrase with respect to secret
detention that is found in Article 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute,
which declares: "with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time." 51 There is no
''prolonged period of time" limit in either treaty or in the
customary prohibition of forced disappearance. Moreover, it is
clear that no human being is beyond the protection of the law52
and there is absolutely no requirement in other treaties or
customary international law that a perpetrator intend such a
result.
Another change contained in the Rome Statute involves the
elimination of coverage of persecution type crimes against
humanity committed against non-civilians such as combatants in
the context of an armed conflict, since all crimes against humanity
covered under Article 7 must be part of an attack directed against
civilians.5 3 Unlike the customary definitions that had addressed
persecution on certain "grounds,"54 Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome
Statute does not cover persecution on certain grounds as such, but
merely persecution "against any identifiable group . . . ."65 Perhaps
the targeting of a few members of the group will suffice as
persecution "against" the group, but the persecution will also have
to be part of a widespread or systematic attack on civilians
involving a multiple commission of acts. Additionally, persecution
under the Statute has to involve a "severe" deprivation of
fundamental rights "by reason of the identity of the group or
collectivity."5 6 Perhaps every persecution of a human being is
severe, but the addition of such a requirement might result in a

49. Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons

art. II, done at Belem do Para, Brazil, June 9, 1994.
50. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance art. 2, adopted by G.A. Res. 61/177, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/177/Annex (Dec. 20, 2006).
51. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(i).
52. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 655-56, 816, 825;
Paust, Torture, supra note 43, at 1552-53, 1568 n.98 (noting that torture is
prohibited regardless of the status of the victim).
53. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h); PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 769.
54. See, e.g., supra text accompanying at notes 11-16 (discussing what is
required for persecution).
55. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h).
56. Id. art. 7(2)(g).
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limitation of coverage if it is not recognized that persecutions of
human beings are necessarily severe.
From the above, it is obvious that the reach of ICC
jurisdiction over customary crimes against humanity is limited in
several respects. It is also clear that states seeking to enact
legislation that can reach all crimes against humanity should not
enact legislation that merely copies Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
Enactment of legislation that can reach all customary crimes
against humanity can be important for a state that prefers to have
an option to prosecute an accused person while fulfilling its duty
under customary international law aut dedere aut judicare (i.e.,

either to hand over or to initiate prosecution).5 7 Clearly also, if
states ever adopt a general or regional multilateral treaty on
crimes against humanity as such, definitional elements should not
merely reflect those found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute because
they are far too limiting and do not reach all forms of customary
crimes against humanity. It is also evident that if a new regional
international criminal tribunal is created, its constitutive
instrument should not contain a definition of crimes against
humanity like Article 7 of the Rome Statute.5 8
III. THE LIMITED REACH OF ICC JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO
WAR CRIMES
The list of war crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC that
is contained in Article 8 of the Rome Statute is extensive.
However, it is well-recognized that every violation of the
customary laws of war is a war crime59 and Article 8's list is not
57. Concerning the duty aut dedere aut judicare with respect to crimes
under customary international law, see PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note
10, at 10, 12, 17-19, 27, 131-32, 138-42; Paust, Torture, supra note 43, at 153743 (expressing strict adherence); Rome Statute, supra note 1, prmbl.
("Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level,...
[r]ecalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes . . . ."). If a state cannot or will
not prosecute, its duty shifts to a duty to extradite an accused to another state
or to render an accused to an international tribunal with jurisdiction.
58. Professor Stuart Ford's suggestion concerning a regional extension of
the ICC is interesting, but such an extension will necessarily have the same
drawback in connection with the limited reach of ICC jurisdiction over
customary crimes against humanity under its Statute. Cf Stuart Ford, The
InternationalCriminal Court and Proximity to the Scene of the Crime: Does the
Rome Statute Permit All of the International Criminal Court's Trial to Take
Place at Local or Regional Chambers, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 715 (2010), also
noting that Professor Burke-White had raised this point. Id. at 715 n.1, citing
William Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement: A PreliminaryExploration,38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 729, 750-52 (2003).
59. See, PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 35, 639, 663
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complete.60
An initial problem concerning possible limits involves
interpretation of the phrase "in particular" in Article 8(1), which
declares: "[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war
crimes in particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy
or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes." 6 1 Since any
violation of the laws of war is a war crime, the quoted language
affirms that the ICC will have jurisdiction over war crimes, and
thereafter a large number of war crimes are set forth in relative
detail in paragraph (2)(a), (b), (c), and (e), it is apparent that the
phrase "in particular" is not a limiting phrase, but is one that
emphasizes the fact that ICC jurisdiction will exist especially or
particularly when crimes are committed as part of a plan or policy
or large-scale set of crimes. This is also apparent in view of the
fact that treaties are to be interpreted in light of the ordinary
meaning of their terms with reference to their object and purpose
and relevant international law. 62 Under customary international
law, war crimes do not have to be committed as part of a plan or
policy or large-scale set of crimes and it would be illogical and not
policy-serving to impose a limitation by interpreting the phrase "in
particular" differently than its ordinary meaning.
Another problem concerning the extent of possible limits
involves interpretation of the phrase "namely, any of the following
acts," which appears in Article 8(2)(a), (b), (c), and (e) with respect
to listed "grave breaches" of Geneva law, other serious violations of
the laws of war during an international armed conflict, serious
violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Contentions during
an armed conflict not of an international character, and other
serious violations of the law of war during an armed conflict not of
an international character. The word "namely" is partly
ambiguous. It is not clear whether the intent was to provide an
exclusive list of acts within the jurisdiction of the Court as opposed
to examples of grave or serious violations. Treaty-based and
customary war crimes are far more numerous, and so are grave or
serious war crimes, but Article 22(2) of the Statute might require
(discussing violations of the customary laws of war).
60. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Crimes Within the Limited Jurisdictionof the
International Criminal Court, in 3 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw:
PROSPECTS 179-87 (John Carey, William V. Dunlap & R. John Pritchard eds.
2006). The rest of this section is borrowed and partly revised from part of the
cited book chapter with permission from BRILL, which holds the copyright
from Transnational Publishers, Inc.
61. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
62. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-32, May
23, 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (addressing the need to interpret a treaty in view
of its ordinary meaning, other relevant international law, and other factors).
See also Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(b), and (3) (stating the court
"shall" apply applicable treaties where appropriate).
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that the lists "be strictly construed" and "not . . . extended by

analogy[,]" especially "[i]n case of ambiguity[,]" because this would
involve interpretation in favor of the accused.6 3 However, it may be
that Article 22(2) merely requires that the crimes listed be strictly
construed, not that the list be construed as an exclusive list of
crimes covered under various portions of Article 8.
In Article 8(2)(a), there is a list of "grave breaches" of the
1949 Geneva Conventions. In paragraph (2)(b), there is a list of
"other serious" war crimes, including other serious breaches of
Geneva law. This splitting of "grave breaches" from "other serious"
breaches of Geneva law may not seem logical to some, but it is
presumably based on the fact that the newer Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions contain additional lists of crimes and
prohibitions, (some of which are "grave breaches"6 4 ) that some
countries have not ratified either or both of the Protocols
(including the United States), and that many but not all of the
provisions of each Protocol are customary international law. 65
Concerning the list of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, there is a confusing placement of a comma in Article
8(2)(a)(iii) between the phrase "wilfully causing great suffering"
and "serious injury." It may well be that with the placement of the
comma "serious injury" need not be "wilfully" caused in order to
constitute a grave breach within Article 8(2)(a). Two other listed
"grave breaches" are tied to the limiting terms "wilful" or
"wilfully,"6 6 but five others are not so limited.67 Thus, the majority
of "grave breaches" need not be wilful or wilfully caused. Article
8(2)(a)(iii) does not contain a previously recommended clarifying
phrase "including rape, enforced prostitution and other sexual
violence of comparable gravity"68 which would have expressly
noted certain examples of "great suffering" or "serious injury to
body or health." Nonetheless, there is widespread recognition that
such acts would be included in phrases such as "great suffering"
and "serious injury to body or health," as well as in the phrase
"torture or inhuman treatment" found in Article 8(2)(a)(ii) and
(c)(i) and (ii).69 Rape and enforced prostitution, as well as other
63. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22(2).
64. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts
(Protocol I), arts. 75 (7)(b), 85-86, 88, June 8, 1997, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I] (listing specifically, the additional "grave breaches").
65. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 643, 660, 698
(addressing the provisions which are customary international law).
66. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(a)(i) and (vi).
67. Id. art. 8(2)(a)(ii), (iv), (v), (vii), and (viii).
68. Observations on the Consolidated ICC Text Before the Final Session of
the PreparatoryCommittee, in 13 bis NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 29, 36
(Leila Sadat Wexler & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1998).
69. PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 693-94. Concerning rape
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relevant acts, are also expressly prohibited in Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)
and (e)(vi), and are war crimes under customary international
law. 70
In Article 8(2)(b), one finds the curious phrase "within the
established framework of international law. . . ." This phrase is

unnecessary with respect to matters covered by the phrase "[o]ther
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict," since such violations must
necessarily be reflected in treaty-based or customary international
law.
Article 8(2)(b)(i) (concerning international armed conflicts)
and a related provision in paragraph (2)(e)(i) (concerning noninternational armed conflicts) properly prohibit attacks on
individual civilians "not taking direct part in hostilities." This
latter phrase makes clear that "civilians" who take an active and
direct part in hostilities can be lawful military targets.7 1 Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which reflects the
customary standard, does not protect every person, but only those
"[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities." 72 Article 4 of
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions only covers "persons who do
not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in
hostilities."73 Thereafter, Article 13 of Protocol II states that "[t]he
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall
and other forms of sexual violence as torture and cruel treatment, see, e.g.,
Paust, Torture, supra note 43, at 1558 & n.74 (addressing depraving sexual
acts). Article 8(2)(c) addresses violations of common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, but only in the context of a non-international armed
conflict. This is somewhat problematic because the rights and duties reflected
in common Article 3 are part of customary international law that is also
applicable during an international armed conflict. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST,
BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN
THE "WAR" ON TERROR 2-3, 137-38 n.19 (2007) (noting this point and providing
citations); PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 649-50; see also
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-31 & nn.57, 63 (2006) (stating Geneva
Convention 3 contains a set of minimum customary rights and duties); id., 548
U.S. at 641-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Some violations of common Article 3
do not appear as such in Article 8(2)(a) or (b) of the Rome Statute. For
example, Article 8(2)(a) and (b) do not expressly prohibit "cruel" treatment and
trial in a court that is not "regularly constituted" and does not afford "all
judicial guarantees" recognized under customary international law. However,
Article 8(2)(a)(ii) covers "inhuman" treatment, which has a lower threshold
than "cruel" treatment, and 8(2)(a)(vi) covers willful deprivation of "rights of
fair and regular trial." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8.
70. PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 691, 693-94.
71. See infra note 75 (addressing civilians as military targets).
72. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC]; infra note
75.
73. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts
(Protocol II) art. 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
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not be the object of attack."74 It is apparent that Article 4 and
Article 13 of Protocol II must be interpreted consistently so that
the phrase "individual civilians" is not read too broadly to cover
persons who are not entitled to protection under Article 4. The
same is true with respect to Article 51 of Protocol I, especially
paragraph 3 of Article 51 (which recognizes that civilians lose
protection when "and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities" 75 ), although Article 50 of Protocol I contains a
presumption of "civilian" status in case of doubt.76 This matter
may otherwise become confusing in cases where the President,
Prime Minister, or Defense Minister of a country are civilians who
have de jure or de facto command authority over the military and
would be a proper military target during an international armed
conflict. During an insurgency, enemy police, para-military,
intelligence agents, guards, and other officials or agents may take
an active part in hostilities and be proper military targets.77 Words
such as "civilian" are not helpful with respect to the propriety of
target selection unless these distinctions are kept in mind.
Perhaps the words "noncombatant" or "non-fighter" would be more
meaningful, but they do not appear to cover all examples of proper
military targets (e.g., the President of the United States, Director
of the CIA, and Secretary of Defense in case of an international
armed conflict during which the United States is engaged in war).
Within Article 8(2)(b)(iv), concerning attacks causing
"incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects[,]" one finds the only provision containing the delimiting
phrase "in the knowledge that such attack will cause .. . ."78 This
74. Id. art. 13.
75. Protocol I, supra note 64, art. 51(3). Concerning "civilians" who lose
such protection, see, e.g., MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH, WALDEMAR
A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 301-04 (1982); NILS
MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION
IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 79-80 (ICRC,
2009) available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/p0990/
IN
KILLING
TARGETED
MELZER,
NILS
$File/ICRC_0020990.pdf;
INTERNATIONAL LAW 56, 319-20, 327-28, 345 (2009); Jordan J. Paust, SelfDefense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of
Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717;
see also infra note 76 (defining civilians in
this context).
76. Protocol I, supra note 64, art. 50(1).
77. See also Jordan J. Paust, An Introduction to and Commentary on
Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. 697, 744 & n.183 (1987); supra note
75 (discussing civilians and also targeted killings).
78. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). The ICC Elements with
respect to this provision states that the perpetrator "knew that the attack
would cause . . . and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an
extent as to be clearly excessive . . . ." International Criminal Court, Elements
of Crimes, art. 8(2)(b)(iv), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000),
reprinted in JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
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is an improper standard or threshold with respect to all forms of
relevant criminal liability and, therefore, is another indication of
the limited reach of ICC jurisdiction. The phrase "in the
knowledge or in wanton disregard that such attack may cause"
would have reached other serious war crimes, but it was not
chosen. Instead, the limiting phrase within Article 8(2)(b)(iv)
assures that an entire area of criminal responsibility attaching to
wanton or reckless disregard of consequences will not be addressed
by the ICC unless it falls within other portions of Article 8(2),
which is possible depending on the language used in other subparagraphs and various features of context. Sometimes the mens
rea standard concerning customary war crimes is reflected in the
words "wilful," "wilfully," or "deliberate," as used in Article 147 of
the 1949 Geneva Civilian Convention7 9 or used a few times with
respect to certain customary war crimes found in the 1919 List of
War Crimes prepared by the Responsibilities Commission,80 but
sometimes the standard includes "wanton" or "wantonly," as in
Article 147 of the Geneva Civilian Conventions' and certain crimes
ICL DOCS.]. Professor
Roger Clark rightly notes that the ICC Elements should also be consulted for a
through consideration of mens rea standards, but that the Elements can create
(and at times have created) more ambiguity leading either to a limiting or an
expanding potential liability with respect to aspects of mens rea or "intent and
knowledge," and in particular with respect to differences between dolus
directus in the first degree (direct intent), dolus directus of the second degree
(awareness of an inevitable outcome), and dolus eventualis (reaching
recklessness). Roger S. Clark, Elements of Crimes in Early Confirmation
Decisions of Pre-Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Court, 6 NEW
ZEALAND YRBK. INT'L L. 209 (2008). He also notes that there is a "default
rule" in Article 30 of the Rome Statute that must also be interpreted and
applied. Id. at 212. This is undoubtedly true, but it is not the purpose of this
article to consider what might be the most thorough and proper interpretation
of Article 30 and the relevant Elements vis a vis particular portions of Article
8 addressed here as opposed to the purpose of alerting the reader to the fact
that Article 8 has some notable limits of liability for wanton or reckless
conduct as opposed to that covered by the customary laws of war. However, I
accept the point that judges will have to consider specific portions of Article 8,
applicable Elements, and delightfully puzzling aspects of the Article 30
"default rule" necessarily contained in phrases such as "[u]nless otherwise
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 328, 338 (2006) [hereinafter

provided ....

intent . .. means to engage in ...

or is aware[,]" and "knowledge

means awareness . . . ." Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 30(1)-(3).
79. GC, supra note 72, art. 147.
80. List of War Crimes Prepared by the Commission on the Responsibility
of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Presented to the
Preliminary Peace Conference, Paris, 29 March 1919, crimes numbers 19 and
23 [hereinafter 1919 List of War Crimes], reprinted in PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET
AL., supra note 10, at 36.
81. GC, supra note 72, art. 147; see also Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field art. 50, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (using the language "wilfully" and
"wantonly"); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 51,
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in the 1919 List. Both instruments are evidence of the fact that
the two standards are different, that their drafters knew how to
set higher or lower thresholds of criminal responsibility, and that
they chose to set higher thresholds only in certain instances.
Indeed, the same points pertain with respect to Article 8 of the
Rome Statute.
More generally with respect to wanton or reckless disregard,
it is informative that Article 44 of the customary 1863 Lieber Code
proscribed "[all1 wanton violence" and Article 16 addressed
"wanton devastation."82 "Wanton devastation and destruction" was
also the standard used in crimes numbers 18 and 20 in the 1919
List of War Crimes prepared by the Responsibilities Commission. 83
With respect to World War II prosecutions, the Report of Justice
Robert H. Jackson to the President of the United States identified
"wanton destruction" as among the "[a]trocities and offenses
against persons or property" to be addressed at Nuremberg.84
Similarly, United States v. List, et al.85 noted that "military
necessity . . . does not admit the wanton devastation of a

district. . . ."86 The crime of "wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages" was also expressly recognized in Article 6(b) of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.87
Thereafter, the Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and
Judgment formulated by the International Law Commission and
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly affirmed that "[v]iolations
of the laws or customs of war . .. include, but are not limited to ...

wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages . . . ."88 The same
crime was also recognized in Article 3(2)(d) of the Bangladesh
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act of 1973.89 More recently, the
Indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic issued by the
ICTY addressed crimes involving "wantonly appropriated and
Oct. 21, 1950 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (using the same language).
82. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, General Orders No. 100 (1863), arts. 16, 44 [hereinafter 1863 Lieber
Code], reprinted in ICL DOCS., supra note 78, at 101, 102-03.
83. 1919 List of War Crimes, supra note 80, crimes numbers 18 ("Wanton
devastation and destruction of property") and 20 ("Wanton destruction of
religious, charitable, educational and historic buildings and monuments"),
reprintedin PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 36.
84. Reprinted in PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 704.
85. United States v. List (The Southeast [Hostages] Case), 11 TRIALS OF
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 757 (1950), reprinted in PAUST,
BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 688.

86. Id. at 1253.
87. Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, supra
note 11, art. 6(b).
88. Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, supra note 14,
princ. VIb.
89. Reprinted in ICL DOCS., supra note 78, at 177, 178.

2010]

Customary Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes

707

looted" property and "wanton and unlawful destruction of'
property.90 The Statute of the ICTY had also identified crimes
involving "extensive destruction and appropriation of property . . .
carried out unlawfully and wantonly" and "wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages."91 Interestingly, Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) and
(e)(xii) of the Rome Statute assures that the ICC will be able to
address "[d]estroying or seizing the enemy's property" without
limiting words such as "intentionally" or "wantonly." 92 In order to
constitute a "grave breach" within the meaning of the Rome
Staute, however, Article 8(2)(a)(iv) requires "[e]xtensive
destruction and appropriation of property .

.

. [that is] carried out

unlawfully and wantonly."9 3
Article 51(5) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions also
provides a standard with a lower mens rea threshold when using
the phrase "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental
loss." 94 Similarly, the phrase "intended, or may be expected, to
cause" found in Article 35(3) of Protocol I95 includes a standard of
responsibility far less than "in the knowledge that such .

.

. will

cause." The "or may be expected" language also appears in the
preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.9 6
A contextually-oriented word implicating a lower threshold
than "in the knowledge that such attack will cause" can also be
found in Article 23(b) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention
No. IV," assuring that it is "especially forbidden . . . to kill or
wound treacherously."98 This crime is also listed in Article
8(2)(b)(xi) and (e)(ix) of the Rome Statute. Similarly, the phrase

90. The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic,
Indictment: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(July 24, 1995),
27, 41, 44, reprinted in PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra
note 10, at 89, 93-94, 97-98.
91. Statute of the ICTY, supra note 21, arts. 2(d) and 3(b).
92. The relevant Elements do not either and, in relevant parts, they merely
require that the perpetrator was "aware" of factual circumstances that
established the status of the property. ICL Docs, supra note 78, at 342, 353.
93. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(a)(iv). The Elements for this
provision include the need for destruction or appropriation that "was extensive
and carried out wantonly." ICL Docs., supra note 78, at 336. But see Rome
Statute, supra note 1, art. 30 (seeming to require only awareness in some
instances).
94. Protocol I, supra note 64, art. 51(5) (emphasis added).
95. Id. art. 35(3) (emphasis added).
96. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (Dec. 2, 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523
(1980); see also Jordan J. Paust, Controlling Prohibited Weapons and the
Illegal Use of Permitted Weapons, 28 McGILL L.J. no. 3, 608, 617 & n.43 (1983)
(using identical language).
97. HC IV, supra note 19.
98. Id., Annex, art. 23(b) (emphasis added).
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"unless such destruction . . . be imperatively demanded[,]" found in

Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Convention is also found in Article
8(2)(b)(xiii) and (e)(xii) of the Rome Staute and requires contextual
inquiry concerning responsibility and can at least implicate
wanton or reckless disregard. Even more generally, military and
civilian leader responsibility can be based on criminal negligence
under the "knew or should have known" standard under
customary international law,99 a standard that is also generally
reflected in Article 28(1) of the Rome Statute concerning military
commanders 00 but that was not used for ICC prosecution of
civilian leaders.101
A related problem concerning ICC coverage of customary
crime involves the oft-repeated phrase "intentionally directing
attacks" that is found in Article 8(2)(b)(i)-(iii), (ix), (xxiv), and
(e)(i)-(iv). For reasons noted above with respect to criminal
responsibility for wanton or reckless disregard, such language
used in the Rome Statute requiring intentionally directed attacks
clearly does not reach all customary criminal responsibility.
However, other language involving the crime of "intentionally
directing attacks against the civilian population as such" 102 seems
appropriate because attacks directed at civilians as such would
necessarily involve the intent to direct an attack against civilians
as such. This is a special crime, different even from the use of
indiscriminate weaponry or indiscriminate attacks-both of which
include responsibility for wanton disregard of consequences.
In Article 8(2)(b)(ii), (v), (ix), and (e)(iv), concerning prohibited
attacks against objects, buildings, towns, and such, one finds the
requirement that, in context, they "are not military objectives." It
should be clear that the requirement applies only when such
objects, buildings, towns, and such are proper military objectives
under international law, not when an accused or adversary
improperly considers them to be military objectives. Whether or
not such are proper military objectives would have to be tested
contextually and in view of objective standards and generally
shared expectations of the international community. As noted,
international law is a necessary background for interpretation of
any treaty.103 Article 21(1)(b) and (3) of the Statute also assures
this approach.
Article 8(2)(b)(vii) does not fully reflect Geneva law. It is quite
limiting of the ICC's jurisdiction because deportation or transfer of
all "or parts" of a population, as set forth in (2)(b)(vii), is far more
99. PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ETAL., supra note 10, at 52-81.
100. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
101. Id. art. 28(2). This gap means that some civilian leaders will have to be
prosecuted in domestic courts or other international fora.
102. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(i) and (e)(i).
103. See supra note 62 (discussing how treaties should be interpreted).
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limiting than Article 49 of the Geneva Civilian Convention, which
explicitly prohibits "[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well
as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory . . .
."104 "[U]nlawful deportation or transfer . . . of a protected person"
is also a grave breach of the Geneva Civilian Convention.105 Crime
number 7 of the customary 1919 List of War Crimes also
proscribes "[d]eportation of civilians," which appears to be broader
than "deportation . .. of all or parts of the population."10 6
Article 8(2)(b)(xi) concerning treacherous killing and
wounding contains words limiting the direct victims to those
"belonging to the hostile nation or army." During a belligerency, as
opposed to a Geneva common Article 3 insurgency, all of the
customary laws of war apply10 7 and, therefore, they also prohibit
the treacherous killing or wounding of any individual belonging to
a "belligerent" military force or unit whether or not the belligerent
constitutes a "nation" under international law or has an "army."
Article 8(2)(b)(xiv) contains a crime involving abolishment,
suspension, or inadmissibility "in a court of law [of] the rights and
actions of the nationals of the hostile party." 08 The prohibition
may beg the question regarding what "rights" an enemy national
might have in time of war-especially as a prisoner of war,
detainee, or person subject to laws concerning occupied territory.
The prohibition should be interpreted logically and consistently
with international law to prohibit a declared abolition or
suspension of "whatever rights" an enemy national might
otherwise actually have had.
The "use" or "employment" of poison or poisoned weapons is
proscribed under customary international law. 109 For this reason,
104. GC, supra note 72, art. 49; see also Statute of the ICTY, supra note 21,
art. 2(g) ("unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian."); Paust, Torture, supra note 43, at 1567-68 (this was one of many
notorious war crimes and grave breaches authorized, abetted, and/or engaged
in by several highest level members of the Bush Administration).
105. GC, supra note 72, art. 147.
106. 1919 List of War Crimes, supra note 80, crime number 7, reprinted in
PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 36.
107. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 645, 648, 651, 673
(discussing "belligerency" and customary laws of war); FM 27-10, supra note
10, at 9, 1 11a. A "belligerency" occurring even entirely within one state is an
armed conflict of an international character, partly because of the status of the
"belligerent" actor under international law. PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra
note 10, at 648, 651, 673.
108. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xiv). This mirrors a customary
provision in the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV. HC IV, supra note 19, Annex,
art. 23(h). See also Paust, Above the Law, supra note 43, at 413-14 n.199
(stating that the 2006 Military Commissions Act violates this law of war).
109. See, e.g., 1863 Lieber Code, supra note 82, arts. 16, 70 (excluding poison
explicitly); 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg ("employment"), reprinted in
PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 679; 1919 List of War Crimes,
supra note 80, crime number 32 (also see number 27 regarding "use" of
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it is appropriate that Article 8(2)(b)(xvii) uses the term
"[e]mploying" and does not contain an additional threshold of
"calculated" or "intentionally." Similarly, the "[e]mploying" of
certain gases and analogous liquids, materials or devices; certain
bullets; and certain other weapons is recognizably within the
jurisdiction of the ICC without further limiting language, as noted
in Article 8(b)(2)(xviii)-(xx).
Article 8(2)(b)(xx) contains language concerning prohibited
weaponry and methods of warfare derived from the customary
prohibitions in Article 23(e) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague
Convention No. IV.11o The French text of the 1907 Hague
Convention is authoritative,111 and the relevant phrase adopted in
Article 8 properly reads "of a nature as to cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering" as opposed to an earlier draft phrase
"calculated to cause unnecessary suffering."112 The word
"calculated" would have imposed a higher mens rea threshold than
required by customary international law reflected in the
authoritative French text. This is so because one can be criminally
responsible, for example, for the use or "employing" of weaponry in
a wanton or reckless disregard of the consequences of such use,
even though actual consequences involving unnecessary death,
injury, and suffering are not "calculated." The phrase "of such a
nature" is contextually-oriented and can involve inquiry into what
sort of weaponry objectively or foreseeably in particular contexts
can cause unnecessary death, injury, or suffering. Furthermore, it
is informing that Article 35(2) of Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions contains the standard "of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."113 Therefore,
Protocol I reflects the authoritative customary standard and
Protocol I also lacks the higher threshold of criminal responsibility
attached to a word such as "calculated."
In Article 8(2)(b)(xxiv) and (e)(ii), there is incomplete coverage
of the crime of using medicine or medical supplies as a weapon.
prohibited bullets); HC IV, supra note 19, Annex, art. 23(a) ("employ"); PAUST,
BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 664, 679-82, 695, 699.
110. HC IV, supra note 19, Annex, art. 23(e).
111. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-1, TREATIES CONCERNING
LAND WARFARE i (1956) ("the only official text of the Hague Conventions of 18
October 1907 is the French text which must be consulted and accepted as
controlling"); PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 680-81.
112. PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 680-81; Jordan J. Paust,
Does Your Police Force Use Illegal Weapons? A Configurative Approach to
Decision IntegratingInternationaland Domestic Law, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 19,
30 n.43 (1977); ICRC, War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and Their Source in International Humanitarian Law,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ Web/eng/siteengO.nsflhtmlall/war-crimesfactsheet311008/$File/ EN%20-%2OWar_ CrimesComparativeTable.pdf , at
14, Oct. 31, 2008.
113. Protocol I, supra note 64, art. 35(2).
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Only medicine and medical supplies "using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions" are covered, but customary
and treaty-based prohibitions are much broader.114
There is language in Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) addressing the
customary crime of "intentionally using starvation." The use of
starvation as a strategy or policy of denial of food clearly involves
responsibility when starvation is intentional or deliberate. Crime
number 4 on the 1919 List of War Crimes uses the phrase
"[d]eliberate starvation""15 and the United Nations Security
Council has condemned the "deliberate impeding of the delivery of
food and medical supplies False" 16 A policy of denial and neglect
involving starvation can also constitute other violations of
humanitarian law when used wantonly or in reckless disregard of
consequences. The indiscriminate use of food as a weapon is
covered under Articles 51(4) ("[i]ndiscriminate attacks") and 54(1)
("[s]tarvation of civilians as a method of warfare") and, especially,
54(2) of Protocol I, as well as under Article 14(1) of Protocol II. A
114. See, e.g., GC, supra note 72, arts. 3, 23, 38, 55, 56, 59, 60; Protocol I,
supra note 64, art. 75; Protocol II, supra note 73, art. 4; 4 COMMENTARY,
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN
TIME OF WAR 40-41, 180 (Jean S. Pictet ed., ICRC 1958); PAUST, BASSIOUNI,
ET AL., supra note 10, at 695-96.
115. 1919 List of War Crimes, supra note 80, crime number 4, reprinted in
PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 36.
116. See, e.g., U.N. S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/787 (1992) (condemning as violations of humanitarian law the
deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian
population in Bosnia-Herzegovina); U.N. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992) (same); U.N. S.C. Res. 794,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) ("Strongly
condemns all violations of international humanitarian law occurring in
Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food
and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population . . .
."); see also Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in
Emergency and Armed Conflict, Dec. 14, 1974, U.N. G.A. Res. 3318 (XXIX),
6 (1974) ("women and children belonging to the
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
civilian population . . . shall not be deprived of shelter, food, medical aid or
other inalienable rights. . . ."), quoted more fully in Donald E. Buckingham, A
Recipe for Change: Towards an Integrated Approach to Food Under
InternationalLaw, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 285, 298 n.53 (1994); Report of the
Secretary-General, supra note 20, 1 6 (violations of humanitarian law include
"impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian
population"); 1995 Indictment of Karadzic and Mladic by the International
22 (regarding inadequate food
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia,
and medical care for civilians detained in camps, including women, children,
and elderly persons), reprinted in PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at
92; Buckingham, supra at 296-301; Jordan J. Paust, The Human Rights to
Food, Medicine and Medical Supplies and Freedom from Arbitrary and
Inhumane Detention and Controls in Sri Lanka, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
617 (1998) [hereinafter Paust, Human Rights to Food, Medicine]; Jordan J.

Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former
Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 499, 516-17 & n.62 (1994).
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policy of denial and neglect involving starvation can also result in
violations, for example, of Articles 3, 16, 23, 24, and 147 of the
Geneva Civilian Convention. Such a policy should also be
prosecutable, for example, under Article 8(2)(a)(ii), (iv), (b)(x), (xi),
(xiii), (xvi), (xxi), (c)(i)-(ii), and (e)(v), (ix), (xi), and (xii) of the Rome
Statute even if starvation is not intentional. In my opinion, food,
like medicine and medical supplies, should always be treated as
neutral property during an armed conflict. Starvation, even of
enemy combatants, seems necessarily inhumane and to involve
unnecessary and lingering death and suffering. 117
Moreover, Article 8(2)(b)(xxv), addressing starvation, is too
limited for a different reason. Not all means of starvation are
addressed, but only starvation perpetuated "by depriving them of
objects indispensable to their survival . . . ."118 The latter phrase

should at least be interpreted logically and in view of a plain
meaning to include starvation by depriving persons of food and
any other "object" that in context is indispensable to the survival
of civilians. Article 54(1) and (2) of Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions lists starvation of civilians and the deprivation of
objects indispensable to their survival as separate crimes.119 In
any event, "starvation of civilians," by any means, is already
proscribed under customary international law.120
IV. CONCLUSION

The International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction
over all international crimes and it is understood that definitions
or lists of crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the ICC are not
meant to be exclusive or to limit in any way the customary
definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes or the
reach more generally of customary international law. Parts II and
III of this Article provide significant detail with respect to
differences between crimes against humanity and war crimes
covered under the Rome Statute and those covered under the
broader reach of customary international law. These differences
are important for several reasons. For example, if future efforts
are made to create a general or regional multilateral treaty
proscribing crimes against humanity, the significant limits with
respect to crimes against humanity set forth in Article 7 of the
Rome Statute should not simply be copied. The same point
117. See, generally, Paust, Human Rights to Food, Medicine, supra note 116
(discussing the deprivation of such necessities during armed conflict).
118. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
119. Protocol I, supra note 64, art. 54(1)-(2).
120. 1919 List of War Crimes, supra note 80, crime number 4; PAUST,
BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 10, at 36, 695-96; see generally, Paust, Human
Rights to Food, Medicine, supra note 116 (addressing the prohibition of
starvation).
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pertains with respect to national legislation that attempts to cover
all crimes against humanity under dynamic customary
international law. 121 Every attempt to set new limits to criminal
responsibility threatens accountability for violations of underlying
human rights. 122
Similarly, national legislation regarding war crimes should
not merely mirror Article 8 of the Statute, but should also contain
a general savings clause that covers all other violations of the
customary laws of war. Additionally, when judges in national and
international fora opine on the nature and reach of customary
international crimes, they should not pretend that ICC definitions
and lists are complete. It is also generally understood that the
International Criminal Court will not be able to address even all of
the crimes that are within its jurisdictional competence, 123 that the
Prosecutor will have to be selective in bringing cases to trial, 124
and that enforcement of international criminal law will remain the
primary responsibility of states.

121. In another writing, I have recommended appropriate federal legislation
for the United States that can incorporate customary crimes against humanity
by reference in a manner similar to piracy and war crime legislation that the
Supreme Court has recognized is constitutionally permissible. See Jordan J.
Paust, The Need for New U.S. Legislation for Prosecution of Genocide and
Other Crimes Against Humanity, 33 VT. L. REV. 717, 727 (2009), available at
(proposing new legislation).
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1481827
122. See, e.g., supra note 22 (covering the issue of why a "plan or policy" is
not a requirement).
123. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(d).
124. Id. art. 53(1)(c), (2)(c).

